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* Much of the material here is drawn from the author’s forthcoming paper, “The Transformation of the 
U.S. Rail Industry,” in Railway Reform and Competition, Gines de Rus and Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, 
editors, Edward-Elgar press. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which he is affiliated. Executive Summary 
 
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 marked a dramatic change in the evolution of the U.S. 
railroad industry by eliminating or greatly reducing federal regulatory control over virtually 
every aspect of rail freight operations.  The stakes in the new policy environment were huge 
because many industry observers feared that if the industry could not substantially increase its 
rate of return, it faced a real possibility of becoming nationalized. The purpose of this paper is to 
assess how railroads and shippers have fared after 25 years of deregulation.  The evidence 
strongly indicates that rail deregulation has accomplished its primary goal of putting the U.S. rail 
freight industry on a more secure financial footing. Surprisingly, deregulation has also turned out 
to be a great boon for shippers as rail carriers have passed on some of their cost savings to them 
in lower rates and significantly improved service times and reliability. I conclude that a fully 
deregulated environment, which would entail elimination of residual regulation by the Surface 
Transportation Board, will preserve this rare win-win outcome and yield even further benefits to 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 marked a dramatic change in the evolution of the U.S. 
railroad industry.  After several decades of regulatory control over virtually every aspect of their 
economic operations, freight operations were substantially deregulated and railroads were given 
the freedom to set rates (within broad limits) for the cargo they transported, abandon unprofitable 
routes, and consolidate with other carriers to a much greater degree than they were able to in the 
past.  
The stakes in the new policy environment for freight operations were huge.  Many 
industry observers feared that if the industry could not substantially increase its rate of return, it 
faced a real possibility of becoming nationalized.   Moreover, if rail freight deregulation failed in 
the United States, it was unlikely that any other country would try this experiment. 
  Today, countries such as Canada and, to some extent, Australia have deregulated their 
rail systems and most other countries are considering some form of regulatory reform.   
Apparently, other nations have interpreted the U.S. railroad deregulation experiment as a 
success.  What aspects of the policy worked and who benefited?  What parts were less successful 
and who was harmed?  What further steps can be taken to enhance industry performance under 
deregulation?  The purpose of this paper is to address these questions. 
 
2.  The Economic Motivation for Policy Change 
 
  The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is the traditional starting point for rail regulation in 
the United States.  Of course, in those days private rail companies carried passengers and freight.  
In 1970, passenger service was transferred to a government corporation (Amtrak) instead of 
being deregulated; thus, I will confine my discussion to freight operations.   
Economic regulation of any industry for a long period of time causes that industry to 
develop a regulatory bequeathed capital structure and a provincial mindset that shapes its 
relations with labor and the government.  Inefficient operating practices and a slow rate of   2
technological progress become deeply engrained in the industry as regulation persists. 
Deregulation therefore cannot be expected to create an efficient and technologically up-to-date 
industry overnight.  However, it can be expected to jump-start the long-term process of 
dismantling the most costly aspects of regulation.     
In the rail freight industry, the costs include the following:
2 
  Distorted prices.  Under regulation, railroad rates were in theory determined by value of 
service pricing, whereby rates for a given commodity were aligned with the value of the 
commodity rather than the cost of shipping it.  Consequently, high-value manufacturing products 
were charged higher rates than low-value bulk commodities such as coal and grain.  The 
rationale for this pricing scheme was that railroads were characterized by significant scale 
economies; thus, some form of price discrimination was necessary to enable the industry to cover 
its fixed costs and earn a normal profit.  Indeed, it can be argued that in its inception value of 
service pricing was tantamount to Ramsey pricing. 
Regardless of its theoretical justification, rail’s regulated rate structure contributed to the 
industry’s decline when intermodal (truck-rail) competition developed.  In this environment it 
became clear that the demand elasticities for time-sensitive shippers of high-value commodities 
were higher than the demand elasticities for shippers of low-value commodities.  By elevating 
rail rates for high-value commodities, value of service pricing helped private and for-hire motor 
carriers capture a large share of rail’s high-value manufacturing traffic.  Consequently, rail was 
left with a traffic mix that became increasingly dominated by low-value freight, which generated 
insufficient revenue to cover rail costs.  Rail carriers had little flexibility to respond to 
competition from trucks or each other by adjusting rates for specific commodities and were 
prevented from negotiating long-term contracts with shippers that had the potential to benefit 
both parties.    
  In addition, rail rates were collectively subject to a rate of return constraint.  During the 
1970s, this constraint—roughly 2-3 percent of capital invested—was far below market rates of 
return, thereby preventing the industry from attracting sufficient capital to maintain its plant and 
equipment.   
                                                           
2 Two classic sources on the costs of rail freight regulation include John R. Meyer, Merton J. Peck, John Stenason, 
and Charles Zwick, The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959 and Ann F. Friedlaender, The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1969.  Theodore E. Keeler, Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1983 provides a detailed discussion of the issues summarized here.   3
  Barriers to exit.  Railroads developed their vast network of track, yards, and switching 
facilities over several decades.  During most of the period that the network was built, rail carriers 
recognized that they would have to compete in some regions of the country with barge 
transportation for shippers’ bulk commodities but they did not envision that they would have to 
compete with truck transportation for shippers’ freight. The construction of the interstate 
highway system turned motor carriers into formidable competitors and ensured that the nation’s 
rail network would no longer transport the volume of traffic that it was designed to carry. 
  However, regulation was not reformed to fit the changing times as railroads were 
prevented from abandoning parts of their network that ceased to be economical.  Instead, 
common carrier obligations forced rail carriers to maintain their network even in situations 
where it was unprofitable for them to do so.    
  Labor utilization.  In many industries, labor relations evolve through a series of voluntary 
negotiations.  Sometimes an industry must endure a strike but presumably after the strike is 
resolved, the industry and labor develop a better understanding of how to settle their differences.  
Because of the importance of rail service to the nation’s economy, the federal government has 
tended to block strikes and forced labor, represented by strong unions, and management to 
submit to compulsory arbitration.   
  As pointed out by Keeler, under regulation there was little progress on instituting work 
rules that would enhance productivity and on setting wages that would reflect productivity.   For 
example, freight train crews were paid for a full day’s work for 100 miles of travel, even if that 
distance entailed less than a day’s work.  In addition, firemen were still required on locomotives 
even after locomotives were powered by diesel fuel.  Generally, the industry was saddled with 
excess labor that was paid higher wages than it would be paid in a competitive market. 
  Technological Progress.  The railroad industry’s poor record of technological advance 
under regulation was also a source of its financial difficulties.  The combination of regulatory 
constraints on behavior and the lack of economic incentives deterred the industry from 
improving its operations and offering new services to shippers.  For example, shippers frequently 
voiced dissatisfaction with the unreliability of railroad service.  When they would ask carriers for 
information about the location of a shipment and when it might arrive at its destination, carriers 
could not offer a satisfactory reply.   Indeed, during the regulated era, Norfolk Southern tracked   4
its cars and locomotives by the primitive expedient of posting a video camera at the entrance of 
each rail yard.   
The potential for introducing larger, more specialized freight cars represents a classic 
example of how rail regulation stifled innovation.
3  An innovation in car design would increase 
the hauling capacity of the equipment, but the car would cost more to purchase.  To exploit the 
innovation, a railroad might want to induce volume by lowering rates for the intended traffic, but 
the Interstate Commerce Commission could, and in practice often did, oppose the new rate.  
Presumably, this opposition was motivated by the desire to protect rail carriers that did not invest 
in larger carrying capacity, thus discouraging other carriers from investing in new types of rail 
cars.  Such episodes were common in the railroad industry, leading the Task Force on Railroad 
Productivity to conclude during the early 1970s that lapses in railroad technology were a primary 
explanation of why total productivity in the rail industry had grown at a rate averaging only 1 to 
2 percent per year while other U.S. industries’ annual total productivity growth averaged 2 to 3 
percent.
4 
 The  inefficiencies  created  by rail regulation put a stranglehold on the industry that 
prevented it from competing effectively.  Rail’s share of freight traffic, which stood at nearly 70 
percent of intercity ton-miles following World War II, fell to 37 percent by 1975.  Moreover, 
following the bankruptcies of several Northeastern and Midwestern railroads in the 1970s, nearly 
every remaining railroad was earning a rate of return below that earned in the corporate sector as 
a whole.  Policymakers were increasingly convinced that the industry needed much greater 
pricing and operating freedom if more bankruptcies were to be avoided; hence, in 1980, 
Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act to deregulate the railroads in a direct unambiguous 
fashion.  In short, the Act directed the industry to return to profitability by relying on the market. 
  Policymakers believed that deregulation would help the railroads return to profitability, 
but they were concerned that railroads might exercise market power and charge some shippers 
exorbitant rates.  Indeed, some academic predictions of the effects of rail deregulation were 
                                                           
3 This example is discussed by Aaron Gellman, “Surface Freight Transportation,” in Technological Change in 
Regulated Industries, William M. Capron, editor, Brookings, Washington, DC, 1971, and Robert E. Gallamore, 
“Regulation and Innovation: Lessons from the American Railroad Industry,” in Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, William B. 
Tye, and Clifford Winston, Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. 
Meyer, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1999. 
4 Task Force on Railroad Productivity, Improving Railroad Productivity: Final Report of the Task Force on 
Railroad Productivity, A Report to the National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic 
Advisors, Washington, DC, 1973. 
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based on shippers having to pay higher rates.
5   Thus, although contract rates were completely 
deregulated, tariff rates for certain commodities were still  
subject to maximum rate “guidelines.” 
6  But, as we shall see, one of the major surprises of rail 
freight deregulation is that railroads and  shippers benefited from the policy—with the rate 
guidelines deserving virtually no credit for this outcome. 
 
3.  The Effects of Rail Freight Deregulation 
 
In general, an industry’s adjustment to deregulation is shaped by the increased operating 
freedoms and intensified competition that force it to become more technologically advanced, to 
adopt more efficient operating and marketing practices, and to respond more effectively to 
external shocks.  As noted, inefficiencies in the railroad industry developed over several decades, 
so it is going to take considerable time for the full effects of deregulation to be realized.  In 
addition, as rail carriers continue to adjust to deregulation, the full costs of regulation will be 
better understood because the innovative and entrepreneurial activity that regulation suppressed 
will become more apparent. 
Competition in intercity freight markets occurs at the route level—as defined by a 
specific origin and destination.  In the United States, the alternative freight modes include 
railroads, motor carriers, and, in some markets, barge transportation (air freight has a small share 
of traffic).  Thus, from a shipper’s perspective, the intensity of intra and intermodal competition 
at the route level is far more important than the number of railroads at the national level.  
Following deregulation, no large railroad entered the industry, while the number of 
railroads at the national level declined substantially as carriers consolidated through end-to-end 
(vertical) mergers and parallel (horizontal) mergers.  As discussed shortly, these mergers had 
beneficial effects on shippers and railroads.  
The extent of merger activity is exhibited in table 1 by rail carriers that provided service 
in 1984 but subsequently merged with another carrier.  The absorption of Conrail by Norfolk 
                                                           
5 See, for example, Richard C. Levin, “Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare under Deregulation,” Bell Journal 
of Economics, vol. 12, Spring 1981, pp. 1-26. 
6 The Surface Transportation Board—the successor to the Interstate Commerce Commission—was given the 
authority to determine the legality of rates in accordance with maximum rate guidelines.  Under these guidelines, 
shippers can challenge a rate if it exceeds 180 percent of variable costs and if the railroad in question has no 
effective competition.   6
Southern and CSX in 1999 left the United States with four large (Class I) railroads—Norfolk 
Southern and CSX in the East, and Burlington Northern-Santa Fe and Union Pacific-Southern 
Pacific in the West.  But competition among these remaining railroads has become extremely 
intense.  In addition, since deregulation, the number of smaller low-cost (nonunion) railroads, 
such as Montana Rail Link, has increased substantially; these railroads have formed small 
systems from track purchased from large railroads.  Finally, railroads must compete fiercely with 
deregulated motor carriers.  Deregulation of trucking, effectuated by the 1980 Motor Carrier Act, 
spurred the development of advanced truckload carriers that are very formidable competitors 
because of their low costs and superior service.    
 
Effects on rail profitability 
Railroads had to significantly reduce their costs to improve financial performance.  This 
was accomplished in several ways.  First, deregulation gave railroads the freedom to negotiate 
contract rates.  Today, more than half of all rail traffic moves at such rates.  Contract rates 
allowed railroads to tailor their services to shippers’ preferences and for both parties to share the 
resulting gains in productivity.  For example, shippers who required service to and from a given 
destination would receive a reduced rate because they eliminated an empty backhaul (i.e., excess 
capacity) for the railroad.  Similarly, shippers who required a unit train to transport large 
shipments would receive a reduced rate because they helped exhaust economies of traffic 
density.   
Rail improved the efficiency of its network by abandoning thousands of miles of 
unprofitable low-density lines and eliminating duplicate track in the wake of various parallel 
mergers.  These mergers also enabled rail carriers to choose the most efficient parallel line to 
keep in the network.  Since deregulation, rail’s track miles have fallen from 270,000 to 170,000 
and its traffic density (measured by millions of ton-miles per mile of track) has increased from 
3.4 to 8.9.
7  Railroads also cut costs by eliminating cabooses and related crew members.  Bitzan  




                                                           
7 These figures are from Railroad Facts (2003 edition), Association of American Railroads, Washington, DC. 
8 John D. Bitzan and Theodore E. Keeler, “Productivity Growth and Some of Its Determinants in the Deregulated 
U.S. Railroad Industry,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 70, October 2003, pp. 232-253.   7
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With billions of dollars of sunk, long-lived capital investments, railroads were not 
immediately able to replace old technology with new technology.  Nonetheless, deregulation 
gave railroads the freedom and incentive to make some important operational and technological 
improvements that raised service quality and reduced costs.  Some of these changes included the 
greater use of intermodal operations, the introduction of unit trains for coal and grain, the 
development of double stack rail cars for manufactured commodities, and the further application 
of computer information systems to track shipments and route cargo.  The video cameras that 
were once placed in rail yards to monitor freight cars were replaced with electronic scanners that 
automatically recorded each car’s arrival.    
Gallamore points out that as rail’s cash flow improved it was also able to upgrade its 
technology and replace its worn out capital.
9  For example, railroads revitalized their plants with 
stronger and better-maintained track that reduced train derailments and cut the time that track is 
taken out of service for rebuilding.  Rail carriers also acquired newer, larger, and more reliable 
locomotives to handle the growth in traffic. 
                                                           
9 Gallamore, “Regulation and Innovation: Lessons from the American Railroad Industry.” 
 
Carrier Acquired  Ultimate Acquiring 
Carrier 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe  Burlington Northern 
  




Chicago & Northwestern, Denver, Rio Grande & 
Western, Missiouri-Kansas-Texas, Missouri Pacific, 
Southern Pacific, Saint Louis-Southwestern 
Union Pacific 
  
Norfolk & Western, Southern Railway System  Norfolk Southern 
  
Grand Trunk & Western, Illinois Central Gulf  Canadian National 
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Collectively, the changes in rail operations and technology spurred by deregulation 
enabled the industry to substantially cut its costs.  As shown in Figure 2, real operating costs per 
ton-mile have fallen steadily, and as of 2002, were 69 percent lower than when deregulation 
began.  Of course, some of the cost decline can be attributed to the long-run trend in rail’s traffic 
mix to include a greater proportion of low-cost bulk traffic.  On the other hand, Keeler and 
Bitzan document that railroads have accrued large cost savings from productivity growth that has 
continued to accelerate since deregulation; thus, deregulation’s contribution to observed cost 
declines is substantial.  
  In addition to reducing its costs, the rail industry has also increased its traffic.  After 
reaching a postwar low in the mid-1980s, originating rail carloads have grown from 19.5 million 
in 1985 to 27.9 million in 2002.
10  During this period, its share of intercity freight, measured in 
ton-miles, increased from 37 percent to 40 percent.  The combined result of the cost savings and 
increased output is that rail profitability has significantly improved since deregulation.  During 
1971-80, the industry’s return on equity averaged less than 3 percent; during the 1990s the 
industry’s return on equity has averaged 10.7 percent a year.
11  
 
Effects on Shippers 
  The evidence that I have presented substantiates that rail deregulation accomplished its 
primary goal of putting the U.S. rail freight industry on a more secure financial footing.   
Policymakers were less certain about how shippers would fare under the new policy and, as 
noted, introduced some safeguards to protect so-called “captive” shippers from being exploited. 
Surprisingly, deregulation has turned out to be a great boon for shippers.  Given the intensity of 
competition in surface freight transportation, rail passed on some of its cost savings to shippers 
in lower rates.   As shown in Figure 3, real rail rates have declined since deregulation.  Thus far, 
real rail rates have fallen 65 percent.  Some of the decline in rail rates, like the decline in rail 
costs, can be attributed to the long-run trend in railroads’ traffic mix to include a greater 
proportion of lower-priced bulk traffic but deregulation’s contribution has been substantial.  For 
example, Ellig surveys evidence from various sources and concludes that at least one-third, and 
                                                           
10  Railroad Facts (2003 edition), Association of American Railroads, Washington, DC.  
11 General Accounting Office, Railroad Regulation: Changes in Railroad Rates and Service Quality since 1990, 
GAO/RCED-99-93, April 1999. 
   9
possibly much more, of the rate reductions since 1980 can be attributed to the Staggers Rail Act.  
As a baseline estimate, this implies that deregulation has, on average, lowered shippers’ rates 
more than 20 percent.
12   
 
Figure 2 

























Source: Association of American Railroads (1993, 2000, 2003) 
 
    To be sure, shippers have not benefited equally.  Large rail shippers in high-density 
markets have been able to negotiate lower rates than small shippers in low-density markets, but 
                                                           
12   Jerry Ellig, “Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 21, pp. 143-
167, April 2002.   10
small shippers have been able to increase their rate savings by obtaining lower rates through 
third-party logistics firms that represent a group of shippers in their negotiations with railroads.  
As shown in table 2, shippers of all commodity groups have benefited from declines in their 
rates, although some shippers have gained more than others.  It is striking that coal shippers, who 
are thought to have more captive traffic than other shippers, have experienced the largest rate 
declines during the 1990s.   
 
Figure 3 
























Source: Association of American Railroads (1993, 2000, 2003) 
  
During regulation, rail’s slow transit time and its unreliability were a serious problem in 
an economy that was becoming more service oriented.  Indeed, the competitive advantage of 
trucking largely stemmed from its ability to offer much faster and more reliable service that, for 
example, facilitated just-in-time inventory practices.  Following deregulation, rail greatly 
improved its service, partly through end-to-end mergers that reduced the frequency with which 
an originating rail carrier had to switch its cars to another railroad to complete the movement.    11
Based on the first decade of deregulation, one study found that the annual benefits to shippers 
from lower rates and improvements in service time and reliability amounted to at least $12 
billion (1999 dollars).
13  In all likelihood, these benefits have grown as rail has continued to 
improve its operations and lower its costs.      
In sum, rail deregulation turned out to surprise policymakers by evolving into a rare 
“win-win” outcome for consumers and industry.  And this outcome has been achieved while 
rail’s overall safety record has continued to improve.
14  Not surprisingly, the gains have come at 
some expense to labor in the form of reduced employment but not in lower wages. 
 
4.  The Intensity of Rail Competition 
 
The benefits to shippers from deregulation may be surprising in light of the substantial 
industry consolidation that began in the early 1980s, leaving many shippers with at most two rail 
carriers to compete for their business.  Why is that sufficient intramodal rail competition?  
  Rail competition may arise in several ways.   Two railroads can compete directly for a 
shipper’s traffic if their tracks traverse directly into the shipper’s plant or if they have access to 
the shipper through reciprocal or terminal switching.
15  However, shippers who are captive to 
one railroad may also benefit from locational competition supplied by a nearby carrier.  For 
example, a shipper may be served by Railroad A but threaten to locate a new facility on or build 
a spur line to Railroad B as a bargaining chip to obtain a lower rate from Railroad A or to get 
Railroad B to commit to a reduced rate.  Shippers could also stimulate railroad competition in 
some cases through product or geographic competition.  For example, an industrial site served 
only by Railroad A in a given market may be able to use a substitute product shipped from a 
                                                           
13  Clifford Winston, Thomas M. Corsi, Curtis M. Grimm, and Carol A. Evans, The Economic Effects of Surface 
Freight Deregulation, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1990. 
14  Ian Savage, “The Economics of Commercial Transportation Safety,” in Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, William B. Tye, 
and Clifford Winston, Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1999 reports that the rate of derailments and collisions and fatality rates for 
employees and at crossing facilities have declined since deregulation, although fatality rates for trespassers have 
slightly increased.  
15 Graphical characterizations of these situations are presented in Curtis M. Grimm and Clifford Winston, 
“Competition in the Deregulated Railroad Industry: Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues,” in Sam Peltzman and 
Clifford Winston, editors, Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next?, Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC, 2000. 
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different origin by Railroad B, or the site could obtain the same product from an alternative 
origin served by Railroad B. 
 
Table 2 
Average Change in Real Rail Rates for  
Selected Commodities, 1982-96 
 
  Average annual percentage change in rail 
rates 
Category  1982-89 1990-96 
All commodities    -4.6  -4.1 
Farm products    -6.7  -1.1 
Metallic ores    -5.2  -5.2 
Coal    -3.3  -7.9 
Food and kindred products    -6.9  -3.7 
Lumber and wood    -6.2  -4.0 
Chemicals    -3.9  -2.4 
Petroleum and coal products    -5.6  -3.0 
Stone, clay, glass and concrete    -5.5  -0.5 
Transportation equipment    -2.4  -2.5 
Intermodal    -5.8  -2.9 
Source: General Accounting Office (1999). 
 
  Such sources of competition are not simply theoretical possibilities.  Grimm and Winston 
found, for example, that a shipper located 50 miles from another railroad pays roughly 16 
percent less in annual freight charges than a shipper located 100 miles from another railroad.  
They also found that receivers who can be served by two or more railroads from different origins 
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5.  Some Remaining Issues 
 
   Although the rail freight industry has been largely deregulated, government’s oversight 
has not been completely eliminated.  To be sure, the Surface Transportation Board’s 
interventions are limited to a relatively small number of rate cases.  But given the legacy of 
government intervention in this industry, rail carriers’ and shippers’ instincts are to engage with 
the Board and Congress to protect and possibly expand their gains from deregulation.  
The rail industry is quick to point out that notwithstanding the improvement in its financial 
performance, it is not revenue adequate.  That is, as shown in Table 3, railroads’ return on 
investment still falls short of their cost of capital.  Thus, the railroads argue that the Surface 
Transportation Board should refrain from trying to appease captive shippers by either concluding 
that rail rates are excessive or by supporting a policy of forced  access to increase rail 
competition.
16   
Shippers, and various organizations that represent them, complain that rail rates are not 
always reasonable and that the Surface Transportation Board’s rate complaint process is time-
consuming, costly, and complex.  Hence, few rates are successfully challenged.  In addition, 
shippers have experienced widely publicized service disruptions in the wake of Union Pacific’s 
merger with Southern Pacific and following Norfolk Southern’s and CSX’s acquisition of 
Conrail.   
The ongoing dispute between captive shippers and railroads should not mar the fact that 
deregulation has been very good for both parties.  Indeed, government intervention at this point 
of the industry’s adjustment to deregulation would be unwise.  As noted, coal shippers have 
experienced declines in their rates.  Furthermore, Grimm and Winston find that the loss to 
captive shippers of any commodity from elevated rates, as compared with the rates paid by 
noncaptive shippers, is small.
17  Indeed, it can be argued that even with this loss, captive shippers 
                                                           
16 Rail’s claim that it is not revenue adequate is not without controversy.  Rail’s large sunk costs and other capital 
assets complicate efforts to estimate the industry’s financial health; thus, the figures in the table should be viewed 
with caution.  
 
17 They estimate that captive shippers pay rates that are roughly 20 percent higher than rates paid by noncaptive 
shippers, which results in a $1.3 billion (1998 dollars) loss to captive shippers and a deadweight loss associated with 
this transfer of only about $60 million.  The latter is consistent with the view that exchange governed by contracts is 
generally efficient. 
   14
still pay lower rates than they paid under regulation.
18   Thus, in my view government should not 
pursue policies such as mandatory access to increase competition.  Instead, it would be 
preferable to eliminate the Surface Transportation Board and completely deregulate rail rates 
while instituting market-based mechanisms to address the captive shipper issue.  In the process, 




Revenue Adequacy of Class I Railroads, 1990-97 
Percent 
Year  Return on investment  Cost of capital  Degree of revenue inadequacy 
1990 8.1  11.8  -3.7 
1991 1.3  11.6  -10.3 
1992 6.3  11.4  -5.1 
1993 7.1  11.4  -4.3 
1994 9.4  12.2  -2.8 
1995 6.9  11.7  -4.8 
1996 9.4  11.9  -2.5 
1997 7.6  11.8  -4.2 
Source: General Accounting Office (1999).  Return on investment is based on the Surface Transportation Board’s 
methodology for determining revenue adequacy.  These returns may not be the same as returns calculated for 
nonregulatory purposes. 
  
To achieve this outcome, shippers and railroads should be prodded to negotiate an end to 
the STB and residual rate regulation.  Freed from the Board’s oversight, limited as it may be, 
railroads could focus completely on improving the efficiency of their operations in a less 
politically charged environment.  Shippers would no longer be frustrated by an agency that 
seems oblivious to their concerns.  Moreover, shippers and railroads could extend the benefits 
they have already achieved through contractual negotiations by achieving additional logistics 
                                                           
18  As noted, deregulation has reduced rates, on average, more than 20 percent, which exceeds the amount that rates 
are elevated for captive shippers as compared with the rates paid by noncaptive shippers.    15
efficiencies as partners, instead of quibbling over the distribution of an ever-shrinking pie as 
adversaries. 
 
6.  Final Comments   
  
As stressed throughout the paper, deregulation is a long-term process.  U.S. railroads’ 
adjustment to their new economic freedoms, while time-consuming, has raised shippers’ welfare 
and restored financial health to an industry that was on the verge of collapse.  Shippers have also 
played an important role in deregulation’s success by negotiating aggressively with railroads to 
obtain price-service packages that optimize their distribution requirements.    
 It may be surprising to some that railroads have needed more than twenty-five years to 
adjust to their new environment—but after one-hundred years of regulation they clearly need 
more than twenty-five years to become fully efficient.  In fact, railroads still have a ways to go to 
optimize service times and reliability, to be fully responsive to shippers, and to achieve potential 
logistical and operational efficiencies. I have suggested that a fully deregulated environment will 
spur the additional adjustments that the industry must make to accomplish these goals. 
  The industry’s structure has also not fully adjusted to deregulation.  It is possible that 
more rail mergers will be proposed until only two (highly efficient) Class I railroads remain in 
the industry.  The end-to-end restructuring, should it come to pass, would create two 
transcontinental railroads but still leave two large railroads in the East and two in the West, and 
thus have little effect on competition.  Indeed, this may be the final equilibrium for the evolution 
of the U.S. rail freight industry.  More importantly, it is likely to result in an industry that 
contributes mightily to the efficiency of the nation’s distribution system for years to come.  
     
 